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Abstract
It is becoming a standard practice for governments to require mining operations to post reclamation bonds. Yet, there have been
few theoretical treatments examining the rationale for bonding mechanisms, and even fewer empirical treatments of the effectiveness
of bonding. This paper addresses some of these holes in the literature. It begins by examining the rationale underlying reclamation
bonds, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of bonding as a tool for enforcing reclamation requirements. The role of bonding
mechanisms is to help enforce standards, not necessarily yield efficient outcomes, and these mechanisms are best viewed as a
complement to — not a substitute for — liability rules. The paper also examines the effectiveness of bonding by drawing on
evidence from hardrock mining on public lands in the western United States. 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The use of bonding mechanisms to ensure site recla-
mation is pervasive in the mining industry worldwide,
yet there are few theoretical or empirical treatments of
bonding issues (Miller, 1998). This is surprising because
public policy debates over bonding issues are fraught
with unresolved questions: When should reclamation
bonds be mandatory? When bonds are required, how
effectively do they promote site reclamation? What is
the appropriate level of setting bonds — the expected
reclamation cost, the worst-case scenario, or some other
level? Should the bond amount depend on the financial
strength of the firm? Do the costs of bonding discourage
exploration and development?
In this paper, I outline a model for thinking about
these questions through the lens of law and economics
scholarship (Cooter and Ulen, 2000; Shavell, 1993;
Becker and Stigler, 1974). Bonding is a mechanism for
enforcing contractual and regulatory provisions (where
the termbondrefers to financial instruments such as sur-
ety bonds, performance bonds, fidelity bonds, and letters
of credit). In the context of mining operations, a firm
posts a bond with the regulator that is released when
reclamation is successfully completed. If site recla-
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mation is not completed, the firm forfeits the bond and
the proceeds are used to finance reclamation.1
If polluters are liable for the harms they cause others,
then bonding might be considered unnecessary or even
superfluous. Bonding mechanisms, however, have a
number of features that make them a complement to —
not a substitute for — liability rules.2 The bond assures
that some resources will be available for reclamation if
the firm fails to clean up the site. In addition, the bond
shifts the burden of proof of a legal dispute from the
damaged party to the polluter. In contrast, under a liab-
ility rule the burden is on the injured party to bring a
suit and demonstrate harm. Once a bond is posted, it is
incumbent upon the firm to demonstrate that the cleanup
1 Various forms of bonds are used to ensure performance or pay-
ment in a number of situations: to ensure that people out on bail appear
in court; to subcontractors and laborers that work on construction pro-
jects; for projects affecting public health or safety; services that are
rife with unscrupulous business practices; and enterprises that require
payment of taxes, such as sales or gasoline taxes (Carman, 1997).
Environmentalists also advocate bonding as an instrument for reg-
ulating activities with uncertain future costs (Perrings, 1989; Costanza
and Perrings, 1990), but bonding mechanisms have a number of
elements that limit both their scope and their effectiveness (Shogren
et al., 1993).
2 See Shavell (1984) for a discussion of the limits of the deterrent
effects of liability rules.
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meets the terms of the agreement before the bond is
released.
The use of bonds also transfers some of the risk of
default from the public to the private sector. In many
cases a third party, such as a surety provider, will assume
part of this risk. For a fee, the surety posts the bond on
behalf of a firm, agreeing to cover the amount of the
bond if the firm defaults. The use of a third party further
reduces public exposure by increasing the number of
parties potentially liable for the cleanup.3 Moreover, the
third party assumes an enforcement role, which encour-
ages contractual or regulatory compliance (Becker and
Stigler, 1974).
The financial incentives and reputation effects
inherent in the use of bonding mechanisms and liability
rules have a number of attractive features, but these fea-
tures do not necessarily imply that mandatory bonding
is desirable. First, although bonding encourages com-
pliance with reclamation agreements, there is no a priori
reason to believe that the benefits of reclamation always
exceed the costs. In other words, bonding promotes regu-
latory compliance, but it in no way suggests that the
standard promulgated by the regulations is necessarily
efficient. Second, bonding encourages low-cost cleanup
because firms are the residual claimant for the difference
between the bond amount and the realized cleanup costs.
Consequently, firms have the incentive to minimize cle-
anup costs, as well as to take precautionary actions dur-
ing the operation phase to facilitate lower cleanup costs.4
Of course, this is also true of a liability rule facing a
solvent agent. Therefore, for an agent that is not a bank-
ruptcy risk, it is not clear why a bonding mechanism is
necessary. Third, bonding can effectively utilize repu-
tation effects. Firms need to have a good reputations
both with surety providers and with regulators. Simi-
larly, regulators must have the reputation of being fair
in the release process, otherwise it will be difficult to
attract business.
The analysis in this paper is a starting point for
addressing issues germane to reclamation bonds. The
following section discusses the basic problem of moral
hazard, the particular problems associated with bank-
ruptcy risk, and the principal motivations for using bond-
3 Bonding requirements do not fully transfer risk because the surety
is only liable for the face value of the bond, and the realized cost of
nonperformance may well be higher than that amount. As a result,
these excess costs are absorbed by the public (e.g., the site is not
reclaimed, or the cleanup is paid by someone other than the respon-
sible party).
4 This is problematic if the regulator cannot perfectly monitor recla-
mation quality. If, however, the firm remains liable for any damages
even after the bond is released, moral hazard on the firm side is
reduced. Consider the case where a firm does a poor job of mitigating
the possibility of acid mine drainage, but the regulator fails to notice
and releases the bond. If an acid drainage problem develops, the firm
remains liable for the cleanup costs.
ing mechanisms. This is followed by an examination of
a firm’s decision on whether to reclaim a site. The effec-
tiveness of bonding is then evaluated using evidence
from hardrock mining on public lands in the western
United States.
Moral hazard, default risk, and bonding
mechanisms
Although there has been considerable interest in the
environmental economics literature concerning the
choice of efficient regulatory instruments, there has been
relatively little attention paid to regulatory enforcement
(Cohen, 1999).5 Yet, enforcement is costly, and firms
have the incentive to cut costs at the expense of environ-
mental quality when enforcement is lax. As a result, the
potential efficiency gains from choosing the correct pol-
icy instrument may well be overwhelmed either by regu-
latory enforcement costs or by a firm’s disregard for the
existing regulations.
The problem of enforcing contracts and regulatory
provisions is often framed as a principal–agent problem.
In the case of US mining, the environmental standards
stipulated in operating permits are often a product of
negotiations between the regulatory agency (the
principal) and the regulated firm (the agent) where
environmental laws provide a baseline negotiations
(McElfish et al., 1996, p. 6). If a principal has high costs
of monitoring performance, the agent may reduce costs
by “shirking” — the standard example of moral hazard.
For instance, a regulator can require a firm to implement
a given technology and can easily observe whether the
firm installs the device. It is more costly, however, for
a regulator to monitor whether that device is turned on,
used properly, and maintained. Thus, high monitoring
costs might lead the regulated firm to shirk, reducing its
costs at the expense of environmental quality.
When there is an agreement between the principal and
the agent that can be verified by a third-party, assigning
liability to the agent effectively addresses the moral haz-
ard problem. For example, it is often easy to observe if
vegetation has taken hold at a reclaimed mine site, or to
sample water for high concentrations of heavy metals.
If monitoring costs are low and the terms of the agree-
ment are clear, it is a straightforward matter for the prin-
cipal to recover damages by assessing a fine or taking
legal action against the shirking agent. In response, the
agent is more likely to take the appropriate level of care.
5 An extensive survey article observes that “the great bulk of the
literature on the economics of environmental regulation simply
assumes that polluters comply with existing directives: they either keep
their discharges within the prescribed limitation or, under a fee scheme,
report accurately their levels of emissions and pay the required fees”
(Cropper and Oates, 1992, p. 695).
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Liability rules will not promote compliance if the
regulated firm is a bankruptcy risk. Environmental liab-
ilities are debts, and therefore can be discharged in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. In effect, the firm’s assets are the
upper bound on liability. A firm is said to be “judgment-
proof” for liabilities beyond existing assets, and conse-
quently ex post fines or damage awards do not provide
adequate deterrence. Thus, the possibility of bankruptcy
affects firm incentives and behavior even for a solvent
firm, and the judgment-proof problem is considered a
central weakness of sole reliance on liability rules
(Shavell, 1986). An approach to the judgment-proof
problem is to require collateral (such as a bond), thus
providing the agent with a direct monetary incentive to
comply with the regulations. If the agent fails to perform,
the forfeited collateral is used to remedy the perform-
ance failure.
A simple equation illustrates the use of bonds as col-
lateral: P is the probability that shirking is detected,b
is the amount of bond posted, andR is the regulatory
compliance cost, withE(R) being the expected regulat-
ory compliance costs. ThenPb is the agent’s expected
cost of shirking. This suggests that the size of the bond
should be inversely related to the probability that shirk-
ing is detected. IfP=1, the amount of the bond posted
should be equal to the expected reclamation costs
(b=E(R)). The probability that shirking is detected is
most likely to be close to one if monitoring costs are
low. These monitoring costs, in turn, are a function of
the number of times a site must be inspected, as well as
the ease in which shirking can be detected and demon-
strated to a third party. Because of the nature of site
reclamation, it might be the case that shirking is easy to
detect and therefore the probability of detection is close
to one.
The collateral also shifts the burden of proof from the
regulator to the firm. That is, if the regulator retains the
collateral (for whatever reason), the firm must initiate a
court action in order to recover the funds. The illus-
tration does not incorporate the effects of the burden of
proof, but presumably it is more costly for the firm to
win as a plaintiff than as a defendant. As for the regu-
lator, holding a bond is comparable to having a bird in
hand.6
6 Note that a bond is not the same as an insurance policy, although
both are instruments of transferring risk. An insurance company calcu-
lates premiums to cover expected payments. In contrast, a surety pro-
vider issues a bond based on credit principles, and the bond premium
covers the underwriting expenses and assumes that there will be no
default. If the probability distribution over expected payments is not
well defined, then insurers hedge against this uncertainty by charging
substantially higher premiums. Surety providers may respond to uncer-
tainty by requiring a higher percentage of the bond amount as a pre-
mium, requiring substantial collateral, or simply refusing to underwrite
the bond.
Problems with bonding mechanisms
There are several problems associated with bonding
mechanisms that limit their applicability (Shogren et al.,
1993). First and foremost, bonding is not free — the
firm, the regulator, and the surety each incur transaction
costs. These transaction costs increase as uncertainty
increases or as contracting becomes more complex, as
complex contracts are costly to write, interpret, and
enforce. For instance, a contract that specifies that
“reasonable efforts must be taken to reclaim the site”
would be likely to be much more difficult to enforce
than one that specified bright-line rules for reclaiming
drill holes, roads, processing facilities, and the like. As
contracting becomes more costly, the effectiveness of the
bonding mechanism decreases. Uncertainty is also a pri-
mary impediment to the smooth operations of liability
rules. Therefore, it is unlikely that the bonding mech-
anism will be an effective substitute for liability rules.
A second problem is that bonds can impose liquidity
constraints on firms. Cash, treasury bonds, certificates of
deposit, and other liquid assets are often acceptable
forms of collateral, but these instruments can tie up a
firm’s operating capital. This liquidity constraint
becomes more binding as the deposit amount increases.
One way to mitigate the liquidity constraint is by involv-
ing a third party, for instance, a surety. For a fee, a surety
agrees to cover the amount of the bond if the agent fails
to fulfill its obligation, which also transfers a portion of
the default risk from the public to the surety provider
(there is not necessarily a transfer of funds that the land-
owner holds in trust; instead, the surety assumes a legal
obligation to provide funds if the firm reneges on its
agreement). The use of a surety reduces, but does not
eliminate, liquidity constraints. The firm must pay an
annual premium, and the bond amount is also a liability
on the firm’s balance sheet that adversely affects the
firm’s credit.7
Although collateral reduces the firm’s moral hazard,
it also introduces moral hazard on the side of the regu-
lator. A wealth-maximizing regulator may have the
incentive to retain the bond whether or not reclamation
is performed. This is a potentially serious defect of the
bonding mechanism. If, however, the operating permit
specifies reclamation requirements that can be verified
by a third-party at a low cost, the firm should be able
to successfully challenge the regulator’s decision. More-
over, it would be difficult for a state with a poor repu-
tation to attract capital to its jurisdiction, and surety pro-
7 The premium is often one to five percent of the face value of the
bond, though large firms can secure a surety by posting less than one
percent, and small firms may face premiums of 15 to 20 percent or
higher. For a discussion of liquidity constraints in coal mining see US
General Accounting Office (1988).
192 D. Gerard / Resources Policy 26 (2000) 189–197
viders would be less likely to underwrite contracts for
operations within that state.8
The decision to reclaim or default
Once mining is completed (and probably even before
mining is completed) firms choose to reclaim the site or
default on the bond. For a solvent firm the decision is
independent of whether the firm or the surety posts the
bond; if the firm fails to reclaim the site and the surety
reimburses the regulator for the amount of the bond, the
firm remains liable to the surety for the amount of the
bond, and to the landowner for any cleanup expense over
and above the amount of the bond. Notice that these
costs are approximately the same as those expected
under a liability rule, as a defaulting firm would incur
legal expenses, and would also be liable for any dam-
ages.
Default has other monetary and non-monetary costs.
For instance, firms have repeat dealings with surety pro-
viders, and surety providers charge higher premiums or
refuse to issue policies on behalf of firms with poor cre-
dit histories. In addition, regulators often have the auth-
ority to block permits for any operator that has a record
of noncompliance. Thus, a firm that remains solvent will
incur higher future costs in obtaining a surety because
of higher premiums and collateral requirements, as well
as the cost of being denied access to a given jurisdiction.
This can pose a serious limitation for mining firms if the
landowner (e.g., the government) is a dominant source
of mineral potential. If government agencies were to
place a permit block on a firm — thus denying the firm
access to other state lands — the amount of land avail-
able for exploration and development could be seri-
ously limited.
These characteristics show that the potential costs of
default are liability to the surety for amount of the bond
(b); liability to the regulator for any additional cleanup
costs (R2b); litigation costs with the surety and/or regu-
lator; costs associated with damaged reputation (C).
Given these costs, there are three cases where the firm




In each case, the expected costs of defaulting are directly
related to the probability of being detected. An increase
8 Of course, it is possible that this is the preferred outcome for
either the regulator or for an anti-mining constituency.
9 Because 0#P#1, it follows in Case 1 both thatb.R and
P(b+C).R. I thank the referee for clarifying this point.
in the probability of being detected increases the likeli-
hood that bond amount encourages reclamation.
In the first two cases the firm definitely chooses to
reclaim the site because total expected costs exceed rec-
lamation costs. The expected outcome in the first case
is no different than what we would expect under a simple
liability rule. The interesting result is that in Case 2. If
P is close to one, as would be expected for monitoring
reclamation projects, then the firm reclaims the site even
though cleanup expenses exceed the bond amount. This
suggests that compliance can be induced with bond lev-
els that are below the expected reclamation costs.
Specifically, a risk neutral regulator could set a bond
amount atb=(R/P)2C. This result is in stark contrast to
Constanza and Perrings (1990), who recommend bond-
ing for the worst-case scenario.
In the third case the reclamation costs exceed the sum
of the bond default amount (for which the firm is liable
to the surety) and additional costs associated with repu-
tation effects. Even so, the firm’s decision is not unam-
biguously to default. Even if the firm defaults on the
bond, it may still be found liable to the landowner for
cleanup expenses beyond the amount of the bond. Thus,
it is not clear what a firm will do in Case 3 until a num-
ber of other variables are quantified — the probability
that a landowner sues to recover damages, the prob-
ability that the landowner wins the suit, expenses
defending these suits, and the expected payments. For a
solvent firm, it is likely that site reclamation is the pref-
erable strategy even if realized reclamation costs far
exceed the bond amount. This helps to explain why in
a number of industries (landfills, underground storage
tanks, and oil tankers) firms must have adequate capital
reserves in order to operate, but bonds are not required.
The implication of the simple model is that firms with
deep pockets are likely to reclaim regardless of the
relationship between the bond amount and the realized
reclamation costs. This suggests that the firm’s financial
position should be a factor in determining whether a
bond is appropriate. The results also suggest that setting
the bond amount at the worst-case scenario would be an
extremely risk averse strategy. In fact, the basic intuition
suggests that compliance can be induced by setting the
bond amount less than the expected reclamation costs.
This, however, is not an unqualified endorsement for
setting bonds below expected reclamation costs. There
are well-known limitations of reliance on liability rules,
as well as marked uncertainties concerning likely recla-
mation costs, especially at large-scale operations that
have the potential to degrade water quality. Moreover,
reputation effects only work in games with repeat play-
ers. The illustration does show, however, that there are
other ways to encourage site reclamation than to increase
the bond amount. Well-functioning surety markets and
use of permit blocks may add to costs,C, and facilitate
site cleanups. If agencies diligently pursue legal actions
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against delinquent operators, this would tilt the firm’s
decision towards site reclamation.
Hardrock mining in the Western United States
The legacy of mining in the western United States
includes thousands of abandoned mines sites that pose
a variety of environmental hazards and safety risks. The
possible degradation from heavy metal contamination or
acid drainage is of course a continuing concern. In
addition, old mine sites often pose public safety hazards,
as a number of people meet untimely deaths in aban-
doned mine shafts each year. In Montana the state has
evaluated more than 3000 sites based on their environ-
mental and safety characteristics, and 350 of these sites
are on a priority cleanup list. The state of Arizona —
currently the leading US producer of hardrock min-
erals — has surveyed 5890 mine openings, shafts, adits,
prospects, and quarried out areas. Of these sites, 118 (2
percent) have possible environmental hazards, and 668
(11 percent) pose public safety hazards (Arizona State
Mine Inspector, 1999).
The abandoned mines legacy is attributed both to a
lack of concern about potential hazards and an absence
of regulation. Attitudes about the public lands, however,
have changed. Mining is now governed by an extensive
regulatory structure that consists of federal statutes,
regulations from federal land agencies, including the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Ser-
vice, and state statutes and regulations. The relevant fed-
eral statutes include the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air
Act, National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered
Species Act, and Superfund. These laws are not specifi-
cally tailored to mining, but the federal land management
agencies each have mining-specific surface management
regulations. The agency regulations address both the
effects of current operations, as well as financial assur-
ances for site reclamation. State governments also have
laws and regulations covering exploration, development,
and reclamation. Mandatory bonding is in place to pre-
vent today’s mining operations from becoming tomor-
row’s abandoned mine sites.
Because there is often substantial overlap of federal
and state requirements, state and federal agencies have
a Memorandum of Understanding that establishes which
agency has the primary regulatory responsibilities. In
most cases, state agencies have the primary roles for per-
mitting the mine, conducting on-site inspections, and
enforcing the permit requirements. This is true even
when the rules are issued by Congress or a federal
agency, and even when the mining takes place on federal
lands. The lead agency negotiates permit provisions with
the mine operator using state and federal rules as a base-
line for the negotiations. This relationship suggests the
principal–agent model is an appropriate way to think
about bonding issues.
The operating permit includes a reclamation plan and
a reclamation cost estimate, as well as a financial assur-
ance of site reclamation. Reclamation requirements
apply whether the operation is a rudimentary surface
scratching that can be addressed with a handful of grass
seed, or a multi-million dollar cleanup of a mine site that
operated for a decade or more. The basic objectives are
to minimize public health risks and to allow the land to
support other uses when mining is completed (Deisley,
1991). The terms of the permit are quite comprehensive,
and include stipulations regarding the reclamation of
drill holes, open pits, processing facilities, and roads, as
well as requirements for backfilling waste rock disposal,
and revegetation.
The monitoring costs for reclamation requirements
vary, but in many cases can be expected to be reasonably
low. The firm requests the release of the bond, and the
regulator has the discretion to withhold the bond if the
site is not satisfactorily reclaimed. In response, the mine
operator (or the surety) can challenge the decision in
court. The court will make its decision based on a com-
parison of the permit terms and the condition of the site,
and the probability that nonperformance is detected is
likely to be close to one.
Bonding provisions
In general, there have been two ways to set bond
amounts. The first is a per-acre calculation. Second, the
bond is set at the expected reclamation costs, which usu-
ally includes administrative expenses and a profit margin
for a third-party contractor. The BLM regulations illus-
trate these two cases. The agency caps bond amounts at
$1000 per acre for exploration projects, and $2000 per
acre for development. In contrast, operations using cyan-
ide or with potential for acid drainage are bonded at the
expected reclamation cost. These BLM requirements are
considered minimum standards, because the western
states have their own bonding rules. Montana and Nev-
ada, for instance, require bonding at the expected recla-
mation costs for all projects.
Table 1 summarizes information about bonded acres
and bond amounts for operators in Montana. Notice that
the amount of the bond is substantially higher than the
amount required by BLM. A recent survey of multi-
national mining companies found annual surety pre-
miums of 0.37 to 1.5 percent of the face value of the
bond (Miller, 1998). The very large mines in Montana
(mines with more than 500 acres bonded) have an aver-
age bond of over $20 million, suggesting annual pre-
miums between $75,000 and $300,000. In addition, the
bond amount is a liability on the firm’s balance sheet.
It is not clear to what degree this expense affects liquid-
ity of a large firm, but many firms consider this a pure
cost (Miller, 1998). If the primary benefit of the bond is
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Table 1
Bonded operations in Montana, January 1999a
Bonded acres Number of sites Average acres bonded Average bond amount ($) Average $/acre
0–100 14 27 143,341 5309
101–500 9 277 3,414,425 12,326
.500 6 2048 21,447,009 10,472
a Source: Montana Department of Environmental Quality
to shift the burden of proof in potential litigation, this
indeed appears to be a steep price to pay.
Firms with limited assets or spotty financial histories
pay a premium that is a much higher percentage of the
bond amount. Small firms also post a higher percentage
of collateral in terms of the bond amount. A 1988 GAO
report found that small coal operations posted collateral
of 25 percent of the face value of the bond; whereas the
amount for large operations was less than 10 percent (US
General Accounting Office, 1988, p. 4).
In response to the problem of surety availability, some
state governments have bond pools for operations that
cannot secure surety bonds privately. Nevada operators
that cannot obtain a private surety, for instance, can join
the state bond pool, but the costs of joining the pool are
higher than obtaining a surety privately (of course, if the
firm could obtain a bond privately, it would not have to
pay higher rates). To enter the Nevada pool, the operator
posts a collateral deposit of 15 percent of the face value
of the bond, and pays a 10 percent annual premium. The
state allows maximum bonds of $250,000 for explo-
ration, and $1 million for mines.
Table 2 lists characteristics of bond-pool participants
in Nevada. Consider the exploration project bonded at
$34,000. Based on the information concerning costs of
joining the state pool, the firm posted $5100 in collateral,
and pays an annual premium of $3400. Assuming a 10
percent opportunity cost on the collateral ($510), the
firm pays an annual fee that amounts to almost 12 per-
cent of the bond amount. This is a substantially higher
percentage than the 0.37 to 1.5 percent paid by large
mines. The state bond pool is one way to address liquid-
ity constraints, and if successful, private bond pools may
arise. However, pooling risks among operators that can-
Table 2
Nevada bond pool participantsa
Type of activity Acres disturbed Bond amount ($) $/acre
Mineral processing 276 713,212 2584
Reclamation 235 328,942 1399
Exploration n/a 34,000 n/a
Mineral processing 85 269,195 3167
Mining 38 53,352 1404
Reclamation 95 124,017 1305
a Source: Nevada Bureau of Land Management Records
not obtain private sureties is likely to introduce an
adverse selection problem — that is, only high risk firms
will select into the bond pool.10
Does hardrock bonding work? Evidence from the
Western United States
There have been audits of surface management regu-
lations in the western states by the US General Account-
ing Office (GAO) and state agencies. The first was a
1986 GAO report revealing a poor record of ensuring
reclamation on BLM lands. Even after BLM promul-
gated its regulations in 1981, the agency only required
bonds for operators that had a record of noncompliance.
The GAO audit identified 556 operations in ten states
and found that only one operator was required to furnish
a bond (US General Accounting Office, 1986, p. 29). As
a result, there was a low rate of reclaimed sites. A review
of 246 inactive or abandoned sites found that 96 sites
(39 percent) went unreclaimed.
A GAO examination of the Forest Service program in
1987 showed more promising results. GAO found that
the Forest Service required financial guarantees for 214
of the 336 operations evaluated for five national forests
in Nevada, Idaho, Montana, and California. (US General
Accounting Office, 1987, p. 12). Operations were dis-
continued at 57 of the 214 sites where the Forest Service
required a bond. Of these sites, one had created no dis-
turbance, 28 sites had been reclaimed by the operator,
10 Miller (1998) discusses the problems of the emergence of
insurance markets for reclamation policies.
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18 were in the process of being reclaimed, and six sites
were inactive but not abandoned. Of the remaining four
cases, the Forest Service used the proceeds from for-
feited bonds to reclaim three sites. The bond amounts
were $6000, $400, and $3585. In another case, the Forest
Service allowed a guarantee of $9700 to lapse, and was
stuck with the cleanup bill (US General Accounting
Office, 1987, p. 12).
The success rate was lower at the 19 sites where the
Forest Service did not secure financial guarantees. Nine
of these sites posed no significant disturbance, in six
cases the operators had reclaimed the site even without
the bond, and four sites were unreclaimed (US General
Accounting Office, 1987, p. 16). The GAO concluded
that the financial guarantees, when required, were an
effective tool for promoting reclamation.
More recently, the Inspector General of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture finished an audit of the Forest Ser-
vice’s handling of abandoned mines. The Inspector Gen-
eral found that “the percent of active sites that become
problems when abandoned are small, [but] the resulting
reclamation costs can be large” (US Department of
Agriculture, 1996, p. 32). For the period 1991 to 1994,
operators failed to reclaim 295 sites. The Forest Service
retained $860,000 in bond forfeitures, and spent
$699,000 reclaiming 146 sites. The estimated cost of
reclaiming the remaining 149 sites is $1.3 million (US
Department of Agriculture, 1996, p. 31). Thus, for the
three to four year period, the Forest Service was left with
$1.14 million in unfunded liabilities.
Finally, a legislative audit of Montana’s mining
enforcement, though critical in many areas, found no
problems with bond releases (Montana Office of the
Legislative Auditor, 1994, p. 20). Table 3 presents infor-
mation on bonds that were released or forfeited between
1978 and 1996. The information was gathered at the
Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
in January of 1999. Of the 28 operations, 13 had full
bond releases, seven partial releases, and eight were for-
feited. A number of sites have multiple release dates,
either because the initial reclamation was not sufficient,
or because of partial release provisions. In some cases
bond amounts are reduced in proportion to the com-
pletion of on-site reclamation. According to DEQ per-
sonnel, the proceeds from the bond (or cash) forfeitures
were generally sufficient to reclaim the sites.
The collateral posted for the sites listed in Table 3,
however, is relatively small — the largest bonds posted
just over $100,000. There are currently ten mines in
Montana with bonds in excess of $1 million, including
a cyanide operation at the Golden Sunlight mine that
has posted a bond of $51.7 million. The effectiveness of
bonding at larger sites is less clear, and the preliminary
indications present mixed signals. For instance, in Mon-
tana, a surety provider recently reimbursed the state for
$6.5 million at the Beal Mountain Mine, and $3.8
million at Basin Creek after bankruptcy of the parent
company.
Enforcement of other provisions
Miller (1998) finds that reclamation bonds are being
used by governments around the world, and the United
States’ experience suggests that bonding is a reasonably
effective means for ensuring reclamation. The wide-
spread use of reclamation bonds and their apparent util-
ity beg the question of why bonding is used for recla-
mation, but not for other dimensions of environmental
protection. Conceivably, regulators could require bonds
to guarantee compliance with other environmental regu-
lations (or any regulations), but if such a practice exists,
it is certainly not the norm.
Shogren et al. (1993) show why the scope of bonding
is limited, and also catalog conditions when bonds are
likely to be effective: (1) well-known damage valuation
(2) a high probability of detecting environmental dam-
age; (3) a well-defined agreement; (4) few parties; (5) a
fixed time horizon; (6) a low bond value; and (7) no
irreversible effects. This list is probably more exhaustive
than it needs to be. The Coase Theorem, for instance,
demonstrates that if there are clear rules (condition 3),
few contracting parties (condition 4), and low transaction
costs (conditions 1 and 2), the efficient outcome will
occur through voluntary exchange.
Interestingly, most of these conditions are in place for
ongoing operations (few parties, clear permit provisions,
fixed time horizon), yet mine operators are not bonded
out for water quality, air quality, and other environmen-
tal performance standards. The probable reason is moni-
toring costs. Most mine sites are infrequently monitored.
In 1996, for instance, the Inspector General of the
Department of Agriculture reviewed 115 active oper-
ations on Forest Service land and found that 69 (60
percent) had not been inspected for more than three
years. Of the sites that had been inspected, 25 had been
inspected once, 13 twice, and only eight sites had been
inspected three times. The Forest Service cited budget
constraints, lack of qualified personnel, remoteness of
sites, and higher priority work as reasons for the lax
inspection record (US Department of Agriculture, 1996,
p. 26). Even if there was regular monitoring, however,
the purpose of the bond is to guarantee financial assur-
ance if the agent shirks. It is not clear that the state would
be in a position to remedy problems at an ongoing oper-
ation.
The bonding mechanism has been compared to a
deposit-refund system — the agent makes an up-front
deposit that is refunded when the principal verifies com-
pliance (Bohm and Russell, 1985). The underlying
motivation is the high default risk on the side of the
agent. The system will work if the conditions are clear,
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Table 3
Bond releases and forfeitures in Montana, 1978–1996a
Case # Minerals Operation Acres Owner Release/Forfeiture
1 gold, silver, lead, zinc, copper underground 9 Forest Service Released $4500
2 gold placer 2 private Released $2000
3 gold placer 4 private Released $2000
4 gold placer 23 Forest Service Released $23,000
Released $1000;
5 gold placer 14 private
Forfeited $14,900
6 gold, silver, copper, lead open pit, underground 10 BLM Forfeited $2000
7 gold, silver placer 12 BLM Forfeited $6600
Released $15,000;
8 gold heap leach
Retained $12,000
9 iron open pit 15 Forfeited $2000
10 gold placer 4 private Forfeited
Released $73,182;
11 gold placer 243 Retained $25,614; Full
Release–12/90
12 gold placer 15 Forfeited $6000
13 gold, silver, lead, zinc underground, mill 47 Forest Service Released $72,000
14 gold placer 40 Released $8000
15 gold placer 244 Forfeited $108,375
16 open pit, mill 14 Released $1250
17 gold placer 16 private Released $4800
Released $6825;
18 gold placer 60
Retained $3675
19 gold placer 20 Released $20,000
20 tungsten, molybdenum underground, mill 15 Released $25,000
21 gold placer 6 Forest Service Released $12,000
Released $100,500;




23 gold placer 30 private 5/87; Released $5812,
3/88; Released $1000
9/94
24 gold placer 23 Forfeited $35,000
Released $2000, 12/93
25 barite quarry 35
Released $12,250, 5/92
Released $5950, 7/93;
26 gold, silver underground 10 Forfeited $21,950,
6/96
27 gold underground, cyanide 160 Forfeited $74,299
Released $6150, 12/91
28 gold placer 193 Forfeited $5865;
Released $14,831, 8/93
a Source: Montana Department of Environmental Quality.
there are low monitoring costs, and the system does not
trigger moral hazard on the side of the principal. Con-
sider the aluminum can recycling programs that are run
in some areas. The customer posts a deposit (e.g., five
cents in some areas of the US) when she buys a can of
soda. The terms of the agreement are clear and easily
verified — if she returns the can, the state refunds her
five cents. Thus, the deposit averts her temptation to put
the can with her other refuse, and it is not likely to
impose a major liquidity constraint. In general, the cus-
tomer is not overly concerned that the state will renege
and refuse to reimburse her.
That the deposit-refund system is operable is unde-
niable — the polluter that tosses a can in the ditch pays
by forfeiting the deposit. There is, however, no way to
tell if this is an instrument that will deliver socially opti-
mal environmental quality at the lowest possible cost. In
fact, it is not clear that the deposit in any way approxi-
mates the marginal social damages associated with fail-
ing to return the can. This underscores the role of the
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bonding mechanism as a means to enforce a standard,
not to necessarily yield an efficient outcome.
Conclusions
The empirical literature on environmental enforce-
ment shows that monitoring effectively deters regulatory
violations (Cohen, 1999), and the theoretical and empiri-
cal results from this paper show that bonding is no
exception. Bonding is a market-based enforcement
mechanism that relies on financial incentives and repu-
tation effects to deliver site reclamation at the lowest
possible cost. Although bonding might be thought of as
a substitute to liability rules, bonding and liability are
actually complements. Some of the same elements that
confound successful working of liability rules also limit
the effectiveness of bonding mechanisms.
The analysis also introduces a number of lingering
questions. For instance, it is clear that there are similar
motivations for minimum financial requirements and
bonding mechanisms. What is less clear is whether these
instruments are close substitutes, and the conditions
where one instrument is preferable to another. The
analysis also shows that the appropriate level of the bond
amount is a function of firm’s capital assets and the
probability distribution over expected reclamation costs.
These issues will have to be addressed if effective public
policies for bonding issues are to be developed.
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